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Banking Stability Determinants in Africa 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the determinants of banking stability in Africa. We present four 
measures of banking stability embedding banks’ loan loss coverage ratio, insolvency risk, 
asset quality ratio, and level of financial development, thereby allowing analysis of banking 
stability determinants from four complementary perspectives: protection for downside credit 
losses, distress arising from insolvency risk, non-performing loans, and financial 
development. The findings indicate that banking efficiency, foreign bank presence, banking 
concentration, size of banking sector, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory 
quality, investor protection, corruption control and unemployment levels are significant 
determinants of banking stability in Africa and the significance of each determinant depends 
on (i) the banking stability proxy employed (ii) and depends on the period of analysis: pre-
crisis, during-crisis or post-crisis. The results highlight the importance of institutional 
quality for banking stability in Africa. Banking supervisors in African countries should 
consider the role of financial structure and institutional quality for banking stability in the 
African region. 
JEL Code: C02, C19, C52, C61, E32, G21 
Keywords: Financial Structure; Banking stability; Institutional Quality, Financial Institutions, 
Bank Performance. 
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1. Introduction 
We investigate the determinants of banking stability in Africa. There is no agreed definition 
for ‘banking stability’ (Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009), although some policymakers like to 
think of banking stability as the absence of banking crises. This lack of agreement has led 
each national bank supervisor to decide for themselves what banking stability is, and 
whether banking stability includes the stability of only traditional banks or the stability of 
non-bank financial institutions as well as shadow banks operating outside the formal 
financial sector. Whatever the definition of banking stability is, an issue that is not clearly 
understood in the literature is the factors that influence banking stability in emerging 
economies, while considering the role of financial structure and institutional quality.  
Frequent banking crises in African countries in the last few years have brought the fragility 
of African banking and finance into unprecedented focus. Often preceded, by a wave of 
commodity and oil import dependence by African countries coupled with exchange rate 
volatility, structural and institutional failures that weaken the efficacy of banks’ risk 
management tactics (Beck and Cull, 2013), it can hardly be said that banking crises were 
widely foreseen. Although African banks have risk models to predict instability trends, an 
understanding of specific stability determinants and the variables to include in bank risk 
models, is important for banks operating in unpredictable environments such as Africa.  
The literature has not examined banking stability determinants in Africa; therefore, this study 
is a comprehensive attempt to investigate the determinants of banking stability in Africa to 
understand why African banking systems are often unstable and susceptible to financial 
difficulties. In theory, bank regulators in developed economies rely mainly on capital 
adequacy for stability (Caprio and Honohan, 1999), and some experts believe that capital 
resources are insufficient to achieve banking stability in developing economies due to 
structural weaknesses (Brunnermeier et al 2009; Barth et al, 2004; Caprio and Honohan, 
1999). Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) point out that regulators place much emphasis 
on micro-and macro-prudential regulations for banking stability but pay little attention to 
factors such as institutional and structural factors that bank stability while Brunnermeier et 
al (2009) also demonstrate that the 2008 global financial crisis and several national banking 
crises in countries around the world proved that crises are prone to occur in countries that 
have weak institutional controls and systemic dependence among banks in the financial 
system (Brunnermeier et al, 2009), and such interdependence can have serious 
consequences for banking stability. Considering these arguments, and the weak institutional 
environment in Africa, it is needful to identify the determinants of banking stability in Africa. 
Our study differs from prior studies in that we are primarily interested in aggregate 
outcomes, rather than in individual bank performance, and we primarily focus on Africa. 
Similar to Klomp and de Haan (2012) and Fernández, González and Suárez (2016), we focus 
on the interaction between banking stability and institutional quality to understand the 
influence of institutional on banking stability in Africa. We use four measures of banking 
stability embedding banks’ loan loss coverage ratio, insolvency risk measured as zscore, 
non-performing loans ratio and private credit to GDP ratio, thereby allowing analysis of 
banking stability determinants from four complementary perspectives: protection for 
downside credit losses, distress arising from insolvency risk, asset quality and financial 
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development levels. Our explanatory variables include bank performance variables, financial 
structure variables, macroeconomic variables, institutional and governance quality variables. 
This approach allows us to identify banking stability determinants for countries in the African 
region. The findings indicate that banking efficiency, foreign bank presence, banking 
concentration, size of banking sector, government effectiveness, political stability, investor 
protection, corruption control and unemployment levels have significant effects for banking 
stability in Africa, depending on the banking stability proxy employed and the crisis-period 
examined. 
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, our study contributes to studies in the 
banking literature that explore banking stability and regulation (such as Allen and Gale, 2004; 
Brunnermeier et al, 2009; Fernández et al, 2016; Schaeck and Cihák, 2014; Segoviano and 
Goodhart, 2009; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009, etc). These studies attempt to identify the 
sources of fragility in the financial system, and to identify potential factors that influence 
stability. We add to this literature by examining the case of Africa. Studies into banking 
stability determinants in Africa is scant in the literature. We show that the significance of 
banking stability determinants in the African region depends on the banking stability proxy 
employed. Secondly, from a policy standpoint, insights gained from our study can help bank 
regulators or/and supervisors in African countries to recognize the importance of assessing 
not only credit loss protection and insolvency risk in the banking system, but also the impact 
of institutional quality, and the impact that such events and institutions would have on the 
stability of the banking system in the Africa. 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant literature 
on banking stability. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Banking stability is the absence of banking crises, achieved through the stability of all banks 
in the banking system or sector (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). In terms of interdependence, 
banking stability can be defined as the stability of banks linked to each other either directly 
through the interbank deposits market and participations in syndicated loans, or indirectly 
through lending to common sectors and proprietary trades (Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009). 
The determinants of banking stability and its effect on financial system stability would differ 
across countries, therefore national bank supervisors are interested to understand banking 
stability determinants. The empirical literature document some economic factors, financial 
structure, regulation and institutional factors that influence banking stability. 
2.1. Economic Factors 
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) show that banking instability can be caused by unexpected 
fluctuation in economic cycles, and the effect of booms and recessions on banking system 
stability will differ across countries. Jokipii and Monnin (2013) investigate the effect of real 
output growth and inflation on banking sector stability, using the VAR methodology approach. 
They use quarterly data for 18 OECD countries over the 1980 to 2008 period and observe a 
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positive relationship between banking sector stability and real output growth while there is 
no clear link between banking sector stability and inflation.  
Unemployment levels is another economic determinant of bank performance. Heffernan and 
Fu (2008) examine the determinants of bank performance while controlling for 
unemployment levels. They predict that rising unemployment can reduce aggregate demand 
and increase loan default rates, hence, implying a negative relationship between 
unemployment levels and bank performance. Since bank performance is a major component 
of bank stability, high unemployment would also be positively correlated with bank instability. 
Heffernan and Fu (2008) examine 96 Chinese banks from the 1999 to 2006 period and find 
that unemployment levels have negative effects for bank performance, and hence bank 
stability.  
Boateng et al (2015) investigate the effect of commercial bank ownership on bank 
performance in China. They examine 111 Chinese commercial banks over the 2000 to 2012 
period. They find that foreign banks have fewer non-performing loans and overall 
performance although lower profitability compared to domestic banks. They also find that 
state-owned banks tend to be more profitable and have better liquidity position compared 
with other domestic banks and foreign banks. Moreover, at bank level, they observe that 
equity/liability ratio exerts significant influence on bank performance, while at the 
macroeconomic level, GDP per capital, GDP growth, inflation and unemployment rates also 
have significant effect on bank performance. 
2.2. Regulation and Supervision 
Barth et al. (2013) argue that banking instability may be caused by incomplete regulation or 
ineffective supervision although both incomplete regulation and ineffective supervision are 
related and cannot be examined in isolation. Incomplete regulation refers to a weak 
regulatory framework which gives rise to the need for regulatory reforms (US Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011), while ineffective supervision involves using weak 
supervisory tools, and the need to adopt the most effective supervisory tools and styles 
(Barth et al., 2013). Empirical evidence for the impact of strict supervision on banking stability 
is rather inconclusive. For instance, Delis and Staikouras (2011) and Bhattacharya et al (2002) 
show that strict banking supervision can limit banks’ risk taking and improve the timing of 
supervisory intervention during periods of instability. On the other hand, Barth et al (2006, 
2008) show that strict banking supervision is not associated with improvements in banking 
stability; and Čihàk and Tieman (2007) suggest that these mixed results are due to differences 
in supervision quality across countries. In other cases, regulation and supervision may have 
no significant effect for banking system stability. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) investigate why 
some banks performed better and poorly during the 2007-2008 global financial crises. Using 
a global sample, they find that better-performing banks had fewer leverage and lower 
returns before the crisis. They also observe that differences in banking regulation across 
countries are uncorrelated with bank performance during the crisis, except that large banks 
from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better; and the 
implication is that banking regulations had no effect for bank stability during the crisis. 
2.3. Institutional Factors 
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Some studies show that institutional quality can influence the stability of the banking system 
of a country (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997), and a country’s governance quality can 
affect banking regulation and supervision intended to influence bank behaviour (Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2012; Klomp and de Haan, 2014). Klomp and de Haan (2014) examine the effect of bank 
regulation and supervision on bank risk. They examine 371 banks from non-industrial 
countries for the 2002 to 2008 period and find that strict regulation and supervision reduces 
bank risk, and the strength of the effect depends on the institutional quality in the domestic 
country. They also observe that capital regulation and supervisory controls also reduce bank 
riskiness while liquidity regulation and activities restriction appear to restrain banking risk 
only when there is a high level of institutional quality.  
Fratzscher et al (2016) were concerned about how the tightening of regulation affects credit 
growth and the implication for bank stability. Building on the premise that strict regulation 
can make banks to reduce lending, they investigate 50 advanced and emerging market 
economies to analyse how post-crisis stringent supervision and regulation affects aggregate 
credit growth and subsequently banking stability. They find that higher capital buffers 
improved aggregate bank stability after the financial crisis, whereas a strengthening of 
supervisory independence helped to reduce the decline in domestic credit and improved the 
stability of banks. They also observe that both effects were stronger for countries with low 
institutional quality. The implication of the findings of Fratzscher et al (2016) is that bank 
supervision/regulation and institutions are substitutes rather than complements for banking 
stability. 
2.4. Financial Structure 
Some studies suggest that banking concentration can also influence the stability of the 
banking system, and there are two opposing views on the concentration-stability argument. 
The first argument is that banks in more concentrated markets will reduce risky lending due 
to lower competition in the market because they have fewer competitors (Allen and Gale 
2004; Repullo, 2004). Another argument is that when the failure of a bank threatens the 
stability of the banking system, banks in more concentrated markets can easily reach an 
agreement to rescue the troubled bank to prevent wide-spread bank failure arising from 
contagion, hence contagion is less likely to occur in more concentrated markets (Sáez and 
Shi, 2004). There is also the argument that it is easier to monitor a system with only a few 
large banks than one with many small banks.  
In contrast, some argue that banks in more concentrated markets can charge higher loan 
rates which can amplify the moral hazard problem on the part of borrowers inducing them 
to invest in more risky projects which may threaten banking system stability when losses 
materialise (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005). Also, banks in concentrated markets can become 
too-big-to-fail, which gives rise to a moral hazard problem on the part of bank managers 
(Mishkin, 1999). Furthermore, the supervision of concentrated banking markets may be 
difficult if banks in such markets tend to be larger and more complex than their counterparts 
operating in less-concentrated markets (Beck et al., 2006).  
Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) observe that banking concentration has negative effects for 
banking stability in the European Union. They show that banking markets exhibiting low 
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competition, fewer diversification opportunities and a higher fraction of government-owned 
banks are more prone to instability whereas capital regulation has positive effects for 
financial stability in the EU. Ijtsma, Spierdijk and Shaffer (2017) investigate the relationship 
between banking concentration and banking stability for the 25 European countries during 
the 1998 to 2014 period. They find no significant effect of banking concentration on either the 
bank-level or the country-level z-score, which measures bank stability. This suggest that 
there was no significant relationship between banking concentration and banking stability 
both at bank-level and country level. 
Some studies suggest that competition may influence banking stability. Schaeck and Cihák 
(2014) examine the effect of competition on banking stability using a measure of competition 
based on the reallocation of profits from inefficient banks to efficient ones. They examine 
European banks and find that competition has positive effects from bank stability, and the 
positive effect is stronger for healthy banks than fragile banks. In a regional study, Liu, 
Molyneux and Wilson (2013) examine banks from 10 European countries over the 2000 to 
2008 periods and find a non-linear relationship between bank competition and stability. They 
also observe that regional economic conditions play a significant role for European banking 
stability. Tan (2017a) examine Chinese commercial banks over the period 2003-2015 under 
an ordinary least square estimator. The results show that high levels of competition lead to 
financial fragility in the Chinese banking industry, and higher profitability positively correlate 
with non-performing loans of Chinese commercial banks. Tan and Floros (2014) investigates 
the inter-temporal relationship between banking profitability, competition and risk among 
Chinese commercial banks over the 2003 to 2009 period. They use the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) and find that Chinese banks with higher profitability operate in less 
competitive environments.  
2.5. Bank Risk 
Bank risk can have implications for banking stability. For instance, Tan and Anchor (2016) 
investigate the inter-relationship between profitability and stability in the Chinese banking 
industry. They examine 5-state-owned commercial banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks 
and 83 city commercial banks over the 2003 to 2013 period. Employing the GMM approach, 
they find that low bank stability (higher insolvency risk) leads to higher profitability measured 
as ROA, and that higher profitability leads to higher bank fragility for Chinese commercial 
banks. Tan and Floros (2013) investigate the relationship between bank efficiency, risk and 
capital. They examine 101 Chinese banks over the 2003 to 2009 period and find a positive and 
significant relationship between risk and efficiency in Chinese banking industry, while the 
relationship between risk (Z-score) and bank capitalization was negatively significant. 
 
Tan (2014) investigate bank performance, risk and competition in the Chinese banking 
industry. Tan use the Panzar-Rosse H statistic and the Lerner index to investigate 
competition in the Chinese banking sector over the 2003 to 2011 period, and find that the 
industry operates under monopolistic competition, while competition among city commercial 
banks is the lowest and competition among joint-stock banks is the highest. Tan further 
examines the impact of competition on risk-taking behaviour (credit risk and insolvency risk), 
and show that in a more competitive environment, Chinese commercial banks tend to 
undertake higher credit risk. Furthermore, Tan and Floros (2018a) test the interrelationships 
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among risk, competition, and efficiency in the Chinese banking industry between 2003 and 
2013, using the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index and stability inefficiency as indicators of 
competition and insolvency risk. They show that greater competition increases liquidity risk 
but decreases credit risk and insolvency risk. Tan and Floros (2018b) also find similar 
evidence. 
 
Tan and Anchor (2017) investigates the impact of competition on credit risk, liquidity risk, 
capital risk and insolvency risk in the Chinese banking industry during the period 2003-2013, 
and observe that greater competition within each bank ownership type (state-owned 
commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks) leads to higher 
credit risk, higher liquidity risk, higher capital risk, but lower insolvency risk, implying that 
competition has some positive effects for stability. Tan (2017b) find that competition leads to 
higher capital, liquidity and credit risk, while higher revenue efficiency leads to lower risk, 
while efficiency is significantly and negatively related to competition.  
2.6. Other Factors 
The literature also identify other factors influence may banking stability such as 
regulatory/supervisory style, deposit insurance, liquidity, bank efficiency etc. Bank efficiency 
is a determinant of bank performance, and bank stability. Berger and DeYoung (1997) argue 
that efficient banks are better at managing their credit risks because they can improve their 
stability by mitigating high non-performing loans. Berger and DeYoung (1997) investigate the 
interrelationship between bank efficiency and problem loans, a proxy for bank stability. They 
employ granger-causality techniques to test the relationships among loan quality, cost 
efficiency and bank capital. They find that higher non-performing loans precede reductions 
in cost efficiency, and they conclude that cost efficiency is an important indicator of future 
problem loans. Carretta et al (2015) investigate the supervisory styles of European bank 
regulators and its impact for banking stability. They examine banks from 15 European Union 
(EU) countries and find that supervisory culture significantly affects the stability of banks in 
Europe. Deposit insurance can also influence stability.  
Ngalawa et al (2016) investigate the impact of moral hazard on the effectiveness of deposit 
insurance to achieve banking stability and find that deposit insurance has no significant effect 
either on banking stability or for bank runs. However, they observe that the interaction 
between deposit insurance with credit to the private sector has positive effects for banking 
stability. Liquidity levels may also influence banking stability. Wagner (2007) shows that 
higher levels of liquidity increases banking instability and the externalities associated with 
banking failures because even though higher asset liquidity directly benefits stability by 
encouraging banks to reduce the risks on their balance sheets and by facilitating the 
liquidation of assets in a crisis, it also makes crises less costly for banks because banks 
have an incentive to take on more risk whose negative effect is offset by the positive effect 
of liquidity for banking stability. 
Taken together, there is substantial evidence for banking stability determinants in Europe 
and Asia, however, empirical evidence for banking stability determinants in Africa is scant in 
the banking literature, and this is our contribution to the literature. We investigate the 
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determinants of banking stability in Africa to identify the factors that influence African 
banking system stability. 
 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
We use country data for Africa from the World Bank. We take a total sample of 48 African 
countries 1  over the 1996 to 2015 period. Country data on banking stability and financial 
structure were obtained from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) collected 
by the World Bank while institutional quality data were obtained from the World Governance 
Indicator collected by the World bank. Some observations are missing for some years, which 
gives us an unbalance final sample.  
3.2. Model Specification 
We run estimations using country-level aggregate data, and regress banking stability as a 
function of its determinants. The baseline model specification we adopt is a modified model 
from Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) and Fernández, González and Suárez (2016), and is 
expressed as: 
Stability = f (bank-level variables, financial structure, institutional quality, macroeconomic 
factors) 
BS = βnBPER + βnFINSTRUCT + βnIGV + βnMACRO + e 
The model is expanded as: 𝐵𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐶𝐼𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝐺𝑁𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽9∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽12𝐺𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽13𝑅𝑄𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽14𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽15𝑃𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑒                                𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1 
Where βn is a vector of coefficients; BS is the banking stability variables: insolvency risk 
(LnZscore), loan loss coverage ratio (LLC), non-performing loans to gross loans ratio (NPL) 
and standard deviation of financial development (SDFD). BPER is the bank performance 
variables: cost efficiency (CI), net interest margin (NIM), non-interest income (NII) and 
regulatory capital ratio (CAR). FINSTRUCT is the financial structure variables: competition 
(LERNER), bank concentration (BCON), foreign bank presence (FGN) and size of the banking 
                                                          
1
 The list of countries included in our sample are Algeria 
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African 
Republic, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, 
Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, Tunisia, 
Tanzania, Swaziland, Sudan, Senegal, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Niger, Namibia, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, 
Libya, Lesotho, Kenya and Gambia.  
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sector (SIZE). IGV is the institutional and country-governance quality variables: rule of law 
index (LEGAL), regulatory quality index (RQ), control of corruption index (COC), political 
stability and absence of terrorism index (PS) and government effectiveness index (GT). 
MACRO variables: inflation (INF), unemployment (UNEMP) and economic growth (∆GDP). 
Variable description is presented in Appendix A1. 
 
 
3.3 Dependent variables 
We use four proxies for banking stability: the Zscore (ZSCORE), the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans (NPL), the ratio of private credit to GDP (FD), and the ratio of loan-loss 
provisions to non-performing loans (LLC). The Zscore is a measure of bank insolvency risk 
calculated at bank level as the return on assets plus the capital-asset ratio divided by the 
standard deviation2 of asset returns. ZSCORE = (ROA+ CAR)/SDROA, where ROA is the rate 
of return on assets, CAR is the capital-asset ratio, and SD_ROA is an estimate of the standard 
deviation of the rate of return on assets. A high Z-score would indicate that the banks are 
more stable, because it is inversely related to the probability of bank insolvency, in other 
words, a high z-score implies lower insolvency risk or improved banking stability (Lepetit 
and Strobel, 2013). Moreover, because the Z-score is considered to be highly skewed, we use 
the natural logarithm of Z-score, which is normally distributed. Laeven and Levine (2009), 
Houston et al (2010), Beck et al (2013) and Fernández, González and Suárez (2016), among 
others, have recently used the natural logarithm of Z-score as a proxy for bank insolvency 
risk when measuring banking stability.  
The non-performing loans to total loans ratio and the loan loss coverage ratios are two 
traditional measures of bank credit risk (Martínez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Nier and 
Baumann, 2006; Ozili and Outa, 2017; Fernández, González and Suárez, 2016; Ozili 2017c). Non-
performing loans to total loans ratio reflect banks’ asset quality. A low non-performing loan 
to gross loans ratio indicates better asset quality which subsequently improves banking 
stability (Ozili, 2015). Loan loss coverage ratio (LLC) is measured as the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to non-performing loans (Caporale et al, 2015; Ozili and Outa, 2017). A higher loan 
loss coverage ratio should provide greater protection against loan losses which contributes 
to improve banking stability while a low loan loss coverage ratio would imply insufficient 
protection against loan losses (Ozili and Outa, 2017). We note that a too low coverage ratio 
may not necessarily imply the risk of under-provisioning since it could also reflect rigorous 
lending practices or a strong insolvency framework where collateral repossession is easy 
for creditors (Mesnard et al., 2016). The fourth dependent variable is the ratio of private credit 
to GDP measuring financial development, defined as the ratio of private credit of deposit 
money banks to GDP. In this study, the financial development ratio is adjusted as the standard 
deviation3 of the ratio of private credit to GDP (SDFD) following the approach of Lin and Huang 
                                                          
2
 The standard deviation is measured from 1996 to 2015 
3
 The standard deviation is measured from 1996 to 2015 
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(2014) and Fernández, González & Suárez (2016), who used this variable as a proxy for 
banking stability at country level. 
3.4. Explanatory variables 
At bank level, we use four variables to control for bank-specific factors influencing banking 
stability: net interest margin, non-interest income, regulatory capital ratios and bank 
efficiency ratio. Net interest margin (NIM) measures banking sector profitability (Ozili and 
Uadiale, 2017; Athanasoglou et al, 2008; Ozili 2017b). Profitable banks have higher net interest 
margin and are more stable than less profitable banks (Dwumfour, 2017); therefore, a positive 
relationship between net interest margin and banking sector stability is expected.  
Regulatory capital ratio (CAR) reflects the amount of risk-capital that banks have to keep for 
the risks they take. In theory, higher capital requirements ensure that banks have sufficient 
capital to absorb unexpected losses when losses materialise (Diamond and Rajan, 2000); 
therefore, the higher the capital requirement the higher the risk-capital banks are required 
to set aside to meet losses that arise from their excessive risk-taking activities (Demirguc-
Kunt et al, 2013), which subsequently improves bank stability. Accordingly, higher regulatory 
capital ratios should lead to greater safety for the banking sector and should lead to greater 
banking stability (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Aiyar et al, 2015); therefore, a positive 
relationship between regulatory capital ratios and banking sector stability is expected.  
Non-interest income (NII) measures profit diversification in the banking sector and reflects 
the banking sector’s reliance on fee-based and non-interest source of funds as opposed to 
their reliance on interest income (Smith et al, 2003; Williams, 2016; Ozili 2017a). Higher non-
interest income implies greater banking sector stability because banks do not have to rely 
solely on interest income which is considered to be unstable due to competition among banks 
for depositors’ money (Smith et al, 2003; Williams, 2016; Ozili 2017a). A banking sector with 
greater reliance on non-interest source of fund should be more stable; therefore, a positive 
relationship between non-interest income and banking sector stability is expected. CI 
variable is the cost to income ratio and reflects the efficiency of the banking sector. Ideally, 
improved cost efficiency in the banking sector would contribute to banking stability; therefore, 
a lower cost-to-income ratio should correlate with improved banking stability. More so, 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) suggest efficient banks are better at managing their credit risk. 
Related studies also confirm that lower cost-to-income ratio improves bank profitability 
when higher profitability correlates with higher stability (Olson and Zoubi, 2011; Athanasoglou 
et al, 2008; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007).  
Our financial structure variables include: the size of the banking sector (SIZE), banking 
competition (LERNER), foreign bank presence (FGN) and banking concentration (BCON). SIZE 
variable is bank deposit to GDP ratio and reflects the size of the banking sector. The bigger 
the banking sector, the higher the depth and/or breadth of financial intermediation in the 
financial system of a country. Provided that a robust systemic risk regulatory framework is 
in place, a large banking sector should be relatively more stable compared to a small banking 
sector; hence, a positive relationship between banking stability and banking sector size is 
expected. Moreover, a large banking sector may correlate with greater banking instability if 
excessive competition drives banks to take excessive risk that could materialise as losses 
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during bad economic times, thereby destabilising the banking system. When this is the case, 
a negative relationship between banking sector stability and the size of the banking sector is 
expected.  
Lerner index is widely used as an indicator of the degree of market power for the banking 
sector, which measures banking competition (Beck et al., 2013). The Lerner index is defined 
as the difference between output prices and marginal costs (relative to prices). The Lerner 
index value ranges from one to zero, with higher numbers indicating greater market power 
and hence less competition (Tan, 2016). Lerner index represents the extent to which a bank 
has market power to set its price above the marginal cost (Tan, 2016). Caminal and Matutes 
(2002) suggest that lower competition can lead to reduced credit rationing and larger loans, 
which can ultimately increase the probability of bank failure, hence greater bank instability. 
This suggests a positive relationship between competition and stability. 
Also, foreign banks’ presence (FGN) can influence bank performance (Hermes and Lensink, 
2004), and subsequently affect financial system stability. FGN variable is measured as the 
ratio of foreign banks to total banks in the country. The presence of foreign banks can 
introduce new technologies and new financial products and services, and also provide a wide 
range of financial services for users of financial services in the country (Hermes and Lensink, 
2004), which together improves the breadth and depth of financial intermediation in the 
financial system thereby contributing to a more stable financial system4; therefore, a positive 
relationship between foreign bank presence and banking stability is expected.  
BCON variable measures banking concentration and we do not have a definite prediction for 
the impact of banking concentration on banking stability as indicated by opposing arguments 
already discussed in the literature review (see, Mishkin, 1999; Allen and Gale 2004; Boyd and 
De Nicoló, 2005). Next, we control for institutional and country-governance quality by using 
the rule of law index (LEGAL) as a proxy for investor protection or institutional protection for 
investors and creditors, and use the regulatory quality (RQ), control of corruption (COC), 
political stability and absence of terrorism (PS) and government effectiveness (GT) indexes 
to control for governance (or institutional) quality in each African country, as used by 
Kaufmann et al (2011). 
Finally, we control for macroeconomic factors affecting banking sector stability. Inflation (INF) 
is used to control for macroeconomic factors influencing banking sector stability (Jokipii and 
Monnin, 2013). During inflationary periods, banks are able to charge higher prices for banking 
(and financial services) offered to customers. Banks can benefit from higher price margins 
during inflationary periods to increase their profitability which contributes to greater banking 
stability (Jokipii and Monnin, 2013); therefore, we expect a positive relationship between 
banking sector stability and inflation. Unemployment (UNEMP) is another macroeconomic 
factor that can potentially influence banking sector stability (Boateng et al, 2015). High 
unemployment makes loan defaults more probable due to increased demand for loans by 
borrowers. Borrowers may have difficulty to repay the principal and/or the interest on the 
loan facility due to loss of jobs during periods of high unemployment, and the resulting default 
on loan repayments could contribute to banking instability. Therefore, high unemployment 
                                                          
4
 The number of foreign banks in an African country may also be viewed as a measure of the political/legal restrictions on 
foreign bank entry in the banking industry. 
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levels should correlate with higher banking sector instability; therefore, we expect a negative 
relationship between banking sector stability and unemployment. Economic growth (∆GDP) 
is another macroeconomic factor that can potentially influence banking sector stability 
(Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). Loan defaults tend to be lower 
during periods of high economic growth, which consequently has positive effects for banking 
sector stability (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003); therefore, we expect a positive relationship 
between banking sector stability and economic growth.  
The estimation technique is the fixed effect regression methodology. Due to substantial 
missing observations, we are unable to run system-GMM estimation because the estimation 
breaks-down because the number of instruments is greater than the observations for a 
system-GMM analysis; therefore, we use the fixed-effect regression estimations throughout 
the paper. For robustness, we cluster the standard errors by country and year. 
4. Empirical Result 
4.1. Correlation 
The correlation table is reported in Table 1A. The correlation table show that multicollinearity 
is not an issue in our model although high correlation among few institutional variables is 
expected as is the case in related studies like Fernández, González & Suárez (2016) and Uhde 
and Heimeshoff (2009). 
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Table 1. Correlations – All Variables 
                  
                  
 BCON  CAR  CI  COC  SIZE  FGN  GDP  GT  INF  LEGAL  LERNER  NII  NIM  PS  RQ  UNEMP   
BCON  1.00                 
                   
                  
CAR  -0.01 1.00                
 0.86                 
                  
CI  0.12 -0.07 1.00               
 0.12 0.34                
                  
COC  0.24*** -0.12 -0.26 1.00              
 0.00 0.10 0.00               
                  
SIZE -0.15* -0.18** -0.52 0.47*** 1.00             
 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00              
                  
FGN  0.18** 0.11 0.02 0.04 -0.12 1.00            
 0.01 0.16 0.73 0.58 0.11             
                  
GDP  -0.02 -0.07 0.36 -0.14* -0.28*** 0.05 1.00           
 0.78 0.35 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.50            
                  
GT  0.04 -0.28*** -0.39 0.86*** 0.65*** -0.06 -0.15*** 1.00          
 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.04            
                  
INF  0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.28*** -0.18** -0.11 0.23*** -0.23** 1.00         
 0.55 0.92 0.89 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.04          
                  
LEGAL  0.07 -0.18** -0.45 0.83*** 0.65*** 0.22 -0.18** 0.88*** -0.19*** 1.00        
 0.33 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01         
                  
LERNER  -0.25*** 0.27*** -0.38 -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.17** 0.05 -0.15* 0.07 1.00       
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.67 0.48 0.03 0.55 0.05 0.35        
                  
NII  0.21** 0.194** 0.33 -0.09 -0.02 -0.08 0.09 -0.16** 0.01 -0.162** -0.20*** 1.00      
 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.82 0.27 0.21 0.04 0.87 0.03 0.01       
                  
NIM  0.11 0.09 0.29 -0.27*** -0.69*** 0.004 0.33*** -0.35*** 0.43*** -0.33** 0.11 -0.09 1.00     
 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.25       
                  
PS  0.19** -0.13* -0.13 0.71*** 0.32*** 0.48*** -0.06 0.67*** -0.19** 0.76*** -0.02 0.02 -0.15** 1.00    
 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.77 0.75 0.05     
                  
RQ -0.02 -0.20** -0.32*** 0.73*** 0.64*** 0.02 -0.17** 0.86*** -0.13* 0.86*** -0.07 -0.09 -0.27*** 0.64*** 1.00   
 0.82 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.23 0.00 0.00    
                  
UNEMP  0.34*** -0.02 -0.04 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.02 -0.22*** 0.26*** -0.15* 0.14* -0.33*** 0.16** -0.39*** 0.32*** 0.24*** 1.00  
 0.00 0.76 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00    
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4.2. Banking Stability Determinants 
The result is reported in Table 2. First, we analyse the determinants of banking stability 
without considering institutional/governance factors in Column 1 to 4, and we subsequently 
incorporate the institutional/governance factors into the model in Column 5 to 8. 
The CI coefficient is positively significant when we use NPL and SDFD as banking stability 
proxies in Column 2&4 of Table 2 and remain significant when we introduce the institutional 
quality variables in Column 6&8, implying that a higher cost-to-income ratio is associated 
with greater banking stability when we use SDFD as the banking stability proxy while a lower 
cost-to-income ratio is associated with fewer non-performing loans when we use NPL as 
the proxy for banking stability; jointly, this suggests that greater banking efficiency improves 
banking stability by lowering non-performing loans. This finding is consistent with the 
findings of Berger and DeYoung (1997), and by implication suggests that efficient African 
banks are better at managing their credit risk which manifests via lower NPLs, thus 
improving banking stability.  
The BCON coefficient is positively significant when we use NPL as the banking stability proxy 
in Column 2 and remain significant when we introduce the institutional quality variables in 
Column 6. This suggests that concentrated African banking sectors experience higher non-
performing loans; hence, greater banking instability. This finding supports the argument of 
Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) who suggest that concentrated banking systems allow banks to 
charge higher loan rates which may encourage borrowers to assume greater risk; and 
consequently, the volume of non-performing loans may increase, and increase the 
probability of bank failure. Also, the finding does not support Ijtsma, Spierdijk and Shaffer 
(2017) who found no significant relationship between banking concentration and banking 
stability both at bank-level and country level. 
The UNEMP coefficient is negatively significant when we use NPL as the proxy for banking 
stability in Column 2 and remain significant when we introduce the institutional quality 
variables in Column 6. This implies that high unemployment is associated with fewer non-
performing loans. This finding does not support the findings of Heffernan and Fu (2008) and 
Boateng et al (2015) who find a negative relationship between unemployment levels and bank 
stability. One explanation for the conflicting result in the case of African banks could be that 
African banks proactively restrain from excessive lending during periods of high 
unemployment periods due to concerns that borrowers cannot repay loans, thus reducing 
the level of nonperforming loans, which consequently improves stability during periods of 
high unemployment. 
FGN coefficient is positively significant when we use LnZSCORE and SDFD as proxies for 
banking stability and is negatively significant when we use NPL as the banking stability proxy. 
The results remain significant only for the LnZSCORE and NPL proxies when we introduce 
the institutional quality variables in Column 5&6. The findings indicate that African countries 
with greater foreign bank presence experience greater banking stability as indicated by the 
fewer non-performing loans ratio and higher banking solvency; thereby leading to greater 
banking stability. This finding supports the finding of Boateng et al (2015) who also find that 
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foreign banks in China have fewer non-performing loans compared to domestic banks, which 
by implication suggest that foreign bank presence contributes to banking sector stability. 
SIZE coefficient is positively significant when we use NPL as the proxy for banking stability 
and remain significant when we introduce the institutional quality variables in Column 6 and 
implies that African countries that have large banking sectors tend to have higher non-
performing loans. This finding does not support the view that large banking sectors tend to 
be relatively more stable compared to a small banking sector. Rather, the finding supports 
Ozili (2017b) who suggest that large banking sectors correlate with greater banking instability 
if excessive competition drives banks to take excessive risk that could materialise as losses 
during bad economic times, thereby destabilising the banking system. 
For the institutional/governance quality factors, RQ coefficient is negatively significant in 
Column 3 and implies that banks in African countries with strong regulatory quality have 
lower loan loss coverage. One explanation for this is that a strong regulatory quality 
environment can make loan losses less likely by indirectly restricting banks from taking 
excessive risks, and as a result, African banks do not have to keep a high loan loss coverage 
ratio. GT coefficient is positively and negatively significant when we use LnZSCORE and NPL 
respectively as banking stability proxies, and implies that banks in African countries with 
strong government effectiveness experience higher banking solvency and fewer 
nonperforming loans, hence greater banking stability. PS coefficient is negatively significant 
when we use LnZSCORE as the banking stability proxy, indicating that political stability is 
negatively associated with banking solvency, and implies that African banks in politically-
stable African countries tend to experience higher insolvency risk. LEGAL coefficient is 
negatively significant when we use SDFD as the banking stability proxy and indicates that 
investor protection is inversely associated with financial development. COC coefficient is 
positively significant when we use LnZSCORE and SDFD as banking stability proxies and 
indicates that corruption control is positively associated with banking solvency and financial 
development, and implies that banks in African countries with strong corruption control 
experience greater banking solvency and higher financial development levels, hence, 
improving stability. The LERNER, INF and CAR coefficients either report insignificant signs or 
conflicting signs after we incorporated the institutional quality variables into the model. 
Similarly, NII coefficient is negatively significant when we use LnZSCORE and SDFD as 
proxies for banking stability in Column 2&4 but is insignificant when we introduce the 
institutional quality variables in Column 6&8. Also, NIM coefficient is insignificant and 
suggests that bank net interest margin has no significant effect for banking stability in Africa. 
Taken together, the results indicate that banking efficiency and foreign bank presence have 
positive effects for banking stability in Africa while banking concentration and size of the 
banking sector has negative effects for banking stability in Africa. At institutional level, higher 
government effectiveness and stronger corruption control has positive effects for banking 
stability while political stability, higher regulatory quality and investor protection are 
inversely associated with African banking stability. 
[Insert Table 2] 
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4.3. Additional/Further Analyses  
4.3.1. Pre-crisis and Post-crisis Determinants 
Next, we investigate banking stability determinants before and after the 2007/2008 global 
financial crisis. To do this, we divide the sample into subsamples: the pre-financial crisis 
period (1996-2006) and the post-financial crisis period, the results are reported in Table 3. 
NIM coefficient is positively significant and suggest that NIM has positive effects for banking 
stability both in the pre-and post-crisis period when we use SDFD as the banking stability 
proxy. This finding supports Ozili and Uadiale (2017); Dwumfour (2017), Athanasoglou et al 
(2008) and Ozili (2017b) who suggest that profitable banks tend to be more stable.  
∆GDP coefficient is also positively significant and suggest that ∆GDP has positive effects for 
banking stability both in the pre-and post-crisis period when we use LLC as the banking 
stability proxy. This finding support Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers 
(2005) who argue that loan defaults tend to be lower during periods of high economic growth, 
which consequently has positive effects for banking sector stability. SIZE coefficient is 
positively significant and suggest that LLC has positive effects for banking stability both in 
the pre- and post-crisis period when we use LnZSCORE and SDFD as the banking stability 
proxy. The finding supports Ozili (2017b) who suggest that large banking sectors correlate 
with greater banking instability if excessive competition drives banks to take excessive risk 
that could materialise as losses during bad economic times, thereby destabilising the 
banking system.  
For the institutional quality variables, RQ coefficient is negatively significant, and suggests 
that RQ has negative effects for bank stability both in the pre-and post-crisis period when 
we use SDFD as the banking stability proxy while LEGAL coefficient has negative effects for 
banking stability both in the pre-and post-crisis period when we use NPL as the banking 
stability proxy. This implies that stronger investor protection reduced rising NPLs in the pre-
crisis and post-crisis while regulatory quality did not improve banking stability. Taken 
together, the results indicate that net interest margin, gross domestic product growth rate 
and size of banking sector have positive effect for banking stability while regulatory quality 
and investor protection have negative effects for banking stability in the pre- and post- crisis 
period. 
[Insert Table 3] 
4.3.2. During-crisis Determinants 
Next, we investigate banking stability determinants during the 2007/2008 global financial 
crisis. To do this, we use the during-crisis subsample from 2007 to 2009. The results are 
reported in Table 4. The result indicates that banking sector size (SIZE), foreign bank 
presence (FGN) and regulatory capital ratios (CAR) are positively associated with banking 
stability when we use SDFD as the banking stability proxy, and implies that lower net income 
margin, low regulatory capital ratios and higher foreign bank presence contributed to African 
banking instability during the global financial crisis. At institutional level, PS coefficient is 
negatively significant when we use LnZSCORE as the banking stability proxy and indicates 
that greater political stability is correlated with greater instability during the financial crisis 
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period. RQ coefficient is negatively significant when we use SDFD and LLC as banking 
stability proxies and indicates that regulatory quality is negatively correlated with financial 
development levels during the crisis. COC coefficient is positively significant when we use 
SDFD as the banking stability proxy and indicates that corruption control is positively 
correlated with financial development levels during the crisis. LEGAL coefficient is negatively 
significant when we use LnZSCORE and LLC as banking stability proxies, and further 
confirms that higher investor protection is associated with higher instability and lower 
financial development levels during the financial crisis period. Taken together, the results 
indicate that low net interest margin, low regulatory capital ratios and weak corruption 
control contributed to the instability of the African banking sector during the global financial 
crisis. 
For all the regression results, all standard errors were adjusted using white’s robust 
standard error correction. Further, we re-run the model using GMM dynamic estimation, but 
the estimator broke down because the number of instruments exceeded the number of 
variables, which further gives validity to the fixed effect regression methodology we adopt. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the determinants of banking stability in Africa. Prior studies have 
documented the role of systemic risk and bank-specific shocks for financial system stability 
with little focus on banking stability in Africa using a large sample. We examine banking 
stability determinants for 48 African countries over the 1996 to 2015 period. Our results 
indicate that banking efficiency, foreign bank presence, banking concentration, size of 
banking sector, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, investor 
protection, corruption control and unemployment levels are significant determinants of 
banking stability in Africa and the effect of each determinant depends on the banking stability 
proxy employed.  
Our results have policy implications. If bank supervisors in African countries want to improve 
banking stability, it is important for national bank supervisors to consider the role of financial 
structure and institutional quality for banking stability. Moreover, our results highlight the 
impact of institutional quality for African banking stability as the literature has extensively 
shown similar evidence for other regions, even when we use multiple banking stability 
proxies for Africa. A fruitful direction for future research would be to investigate the impact 
of economic volatility and stock price volatility on banking stability in Africa. Finally, as an 
extension of Ozili (2018)’s study, future studies can also examine the impact of digital finance 
for banking stability in the African region. 
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Table 2: Main Results 
Table 2 report regression results for banking stability from Column 1 to 4. Column 5-8 includes the institutional and 
governance variables to examine the effect of institutional quality on banking stability. The dependent variable is banking 
stability (BS). Proxies for banking stability are the Z-score (ZSCORE), the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans 
(NPL), the standard deviation of private credit of deposit money banks to GDP (SDFD), and the ratio for loan loss 
provisions to non-performing loans (LLC).  In all estimations we include country and period fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered by country and time. T-statistics are between parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
 Banking Stability Determinants Banking Stability Determinants with institutional 
quality 
 BS: 
LnZSCORE 
BS: NPL BS: LLC BS: SDFD BS: 
lnZSCORE 
BS: NPL BS: LLC BS: SDFD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
C 2.003*** 
(3.54) 
-14.74 
(-0.96) 
49.76 
(0.94) 
13.411*** 
(17.55) 
1.656*** 
(3.43) 
-9.127 
(-0.66) 
27.013 
(0.47) 
13.349*** 
(18.00) 
NIM -0.399 
(-0.71) 
0.268 
(0.42) 
-1.520 
(-0.94) 
-0.003 
(-0.13) 
-0.0002 
(-0.01) 
-0.163 
(-0.34) 
-0.781 
(-0.48) 
0.025 
(0.91) 
NII -0.009* 
(-1.65) 
0.037 
(0.41) 
-0.491 
(-1.25) 
-0.009* 
(-1.79) 
-0.002 
(-0.57) 
-0.078 
(-1.07) 
-0.099 
(-0.24) 
-0.004 
(-0.88) 
CI -0.003 
(-0.75) 
0.386*** 
(3.22) 
0.725 
(1.55) 
0.014*** 
(2.63) 
-0.002 
(-0.59) 
0.286** 
(2.57) 
0.794 
(1.63) 
0.014*** 
(2.75) 
CAR 0.002 
(0.29) 
-0.029 
(-0.17) 
-0.123 
(-0.21) 
0.009 
(0.87) 
-0.005 
(-0.63) 
0.391* 
(1.67) 
-0.400 
(-0.69) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
LERNER -0.019 
(-0.04) 
0.249 
(0.03) 
14.145 
(0.47) 
0.281 
(0.68) 
-0.022 
(-0.05) 
-6.681 
(-1.08) 
12.529 
(0.37) 
-0.941** 
(-2.43) 
BCON 0.001 
(0.46) 
0.122* 
(1.96) 
0.179 
(1.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
0.0003 
(0.13) 
0.099* 
(1.75) 
0.121 
(0.71) 
0.003 
(0.94) 
FGN 0.010*** 
(3.76) 
-0.274** 
(-2.06) 
0.067 
(0.19) 
0.012** 
(2.41) 
0.013*** 
(3.69) 
-0.237*** 
(-2.76) 
0.339 
(0.89) 
0.007 
(1.28) 
SIZE 0.009 
(1.07) 
0.486*** 
(2.71) 
-0.185 
(-0.20) 
-0.002 
(-0.25) 
0.012 
(1.64) 
0.503*** 
(2.67) 
-0.111 
(-0.12) 
-0.002 
(-0.24) 
INF -0.006 
(-1.19) 
0.034 
(0.20) 
1.390 
(1.42) 
-0.003 
(-0.31) 
-0.003 
(-0.73) 
0.059 
(0.43) 
1.456** 
(1.47) 
0.011 
(1.19) 
∆GDP 0.009 
(1.44) 
0.205 
(1.35) 
0.138 
(0.28) 
0.007 
(0.69) 
0.004 
(0.79) 
0.157 
(1.29) 
-0.143 
(-0.28) 
0.007 
(0.48) 
UNEMP 0.012 
(0.85) 
-0.768* 
(-1.66) 
-2.203 
(-1.57) 
0.030 
(1.19) 
-0.004 
(-0.33) 
-1.474*** 
(-2.94) 
-2.718* 
(-1.74) 
0.004 
(0.15) 
RQ     -0.143 
(-0.79) 
-1.250 
(-0.27) 
-32.056* 
(-1.84) 
0.437 
(1.38) 
GT     0.494** 
(2.45) 
-9.961** 
(-2.02) 
-2.063 
(-0.11) 
0.229 
(0.72) 
PS     -0.332** 
(-2.58) 
0.357 
(0.18) 
-6.063 
(-0.82) 
-0.029 
(-0.15) 
LEGAL     -0.061 
(-0.30) 
-16.197** 
(-2.27) 
11.943 
(0.59) 
-0.941** 
(-2.43) 
COC     0.291** 
(2.53) 
0.112 
(0.03) 
26.062** 
(2.45) 
0.786*** 
(2.83) 
Country 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 88.54 65.71 38.62 98.93 90.77 75.26 38.90 99.12 
F-statistic 29.47 7.88 2.94 341.64 33.53 10.81 2.77 371.84 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 163 159 137 163 163 159 137 163 
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Table 3: Pre-crisis and Post-Crisis Banking Stability Determinants 
Table 3 show the OLS results. In all estimations, standard errors are clustered by country and year. The fixed effect 
regression results are not significant hence we did not report it. This table shows results of regressions analysing the 
pre-crisis determinants of banking stability from Column 1to 4 and Column 5-8 shows results of regressions analysing the 
post-crisis determinants of banking stability. The dependent and independent variables remain as previously defined. T-
statistics are between parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Pre-Crisis Banking Stability Determinants Post-Crisis Banking Stability Determinants 
 BS: 
lnZscore 
BS: NPL BS: LLC BS: SDFD BS: 
lnZscore 
BS: NPL BS: LLC BS: SDFD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-
statistic) 
NIM 0.378 
(1.49) 
-0.563 
(-0.75) 
-1.520 
(-0.94) 
0.617*** 
(3.24) 
-0.058 
(-1.39) 
-1.594** 
(-2.38) 
3.842* 
(1.93) 
1.312*** 
(6.25) 
NII 0.008 
(0.53) 
-0.107 
(-0.78) 
-0.491 
(-1.25) 
0.155** 
(2.22) 
-0.009 
(-1.07) 
0.322** 
(2.22) 
-0.029 
(-0.58) 
0.071 
(1.24) 
CI -0.005 
(-0.44) 
0.108 
(0.74) 
0.725 
(1.55) 
0.034 
(0.52) 
0.028*** 
(4.48) 
0.159 
(1.56) 
0.033 
(0.10) 
0.063* 
(1.87) 
CAR 0.033* 
(1.99) 
0.216 
(0.84) 
2.125*** 
(3.19) 
0.261*** 
(3.70) 
0.014 
(1.18) 
0.101 
(0.59) 
-2.457*** 
(-4.43) 
0.279*** 
(-3.63) 
LERNER 0.510 
(0.47) 
1.109 
(0.07) 
-26.779 
(-0.49) 
-1.828 
(-0.44) 
2.115** 
(2.64) 
-37.65*** 
(3.57) 
-2.472 
(-0.06) 
-5.555 
(-1.26) 
BCON -0.011* 
(-1.86) 
0.219** 
(2.37) 
0.314 
(1.60) 
0.002 
(0.09) 
0.004 
(0.82) 
-0.141** 
(-2.54) 
0.708** 
(2.26) 
0.073* 
(1.99) 
FGN 0.010*** 
(3.76) 
0.103 
(1.12) 
0.443* 
(1.98) 
-0.111*** 
(-3.96) 
-0.006 
(-1.44) 
-0.067 
(-1.14) 
0.199 
(1.12) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
SIZE 0.040*** 
(5.24) 
0.219** 
(2.05) 
-0.006 
(-0.01) 
0.111*** 
(4.35) 
0.012*** 
(2.90) 
-0.141** 
(-2.26) 
0.531* 
(1.94) 
0.179*** 
(6.07) 
INF 0.0001 
(0.01) 
-0.260 
(-0.75) 
-0.758 
(-0.65) 
0.120* 
(1.71) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.271 
(-1.60) 
-0.003 
(-0.003) 
-0.163* 
(-1.79) 
∆GDP -0.012 
(-0.52) 
-0.341 
(-1.48) 
1.574*** 
(3.97) 
0.017 
(0.27) 
0.022 
(0.87) 
0.357 
(1.31) 
2.256* 
(1.73) 
0.017 
(0.92) 
UNEMP 0.053*** 
(3.05) 
-1.255*** 
(-4.37) 
-0.792 
(-1.03) 
-0.034 
(-0.55) 
-0.006 
(-0.39) 
0.123 
(1.08) 
0.628 
(0.84) 
-0.233*** 
(-3.16) 
RQ -0.801* 
(-1.66) 
-8.455 
(-1.00) 
-7.995 
(-0.29) 
-8.356*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.346 
(-0.99) 
3.269 
(0.77) 
-41.810** 
(-2.41) 
-9.888*** 
(-5.12) 
GT -0.049 
(-0.12) 
16.863** 
(2.68) 
12.352 
(0.66) 
0.547 
(0.30) 
0.677* 
(1.91) 
-23.10*** 
(-4.18) 
-5.411*** 
(-3.27) 
2.392 
(1.22) 
PS -0.213 
(-0.96) 
-4.958** 
(-2.17) 
-1.421 
(-0.22) 
1.040 
(1.19) 
-0.514*** 
(-3.39) 
-2.818 
(-1.57) 
-0.268 
(-0.03) 
-2.587*** 
(-2.78) 
LEGAL -0.032 
(-0.06) 
-24.943** 
(-2.21) 
-18.323 
(-0.92) 
4.580 
(1.56) 
0.471 
(1.06) 
-11.525** 
(-2.22) 
5.982*** 
(3.08) 
8.170*** 
(2.75) 
COC 0.606 
(1.3) 
3.437 
(0.42) 
9.183 
(0.92) 
4.643** 
(2.03) 
-0.569*** 
(-2.99) 
9.766*** 
(3.99) 
6.813 
(0.85) 
0.243 
(0.18) 
Adjusted R2 46.76 62.26 25.14 62.52 61.31 59.88 58.96 62.52 
Observations 62 59 43 62 65 65 64 65 
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Table 4: Additional Analyses 
During-Crisis Banking Stability Determinants 
Table 3 Column 1-4 show the OLS regression results. In all estimations, standard 
errors are clustered by country and year. 
 BS: lnZscore BS: NPL BS: LLC BS: SDFD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
NIM -0.062* 
(-1.87) 
-0.694 
(-1.22) 
4.586 
(1.16) 
0.616*** 
(3.24) 
NII -0.002 
(-0.41) 
-0.205 
(-1.44) 
-0.747 
(-0.82) 
0.155** 
(2.22) 
CI 0.022** 
(2.63) 
0.520*** 
(3.67) 
0.867* 
(1.99) 
0.034 
(0.52) 
CAR 0.044*** 
(3.35) 
-0.247 
(-0.91) 
0.494 
(0.47) 
0.261*** 
(3.70) 
LERNER 0.503 
(0.62) 
-17.49 
(-1.34) 
-66.29* 
(-1.67) 
-1.828 
(-0.44) 
BCON -0.013* 
(-1.90) 
-0.110 
(-0.97) 
-0.278 
(-0.68) 
0.002 
(0.09) 
FGN 0.005 
(0.94) 
0.132* 
(1.81) 
-0.042 
(-0.12) 
-0.090*** 
(-3.10) 
SIZE 0.005 
(0.94) 
0.146* 
(1.81) 
0.469 
(1.11) 
0.111*** 
(4.35) 
INF 0.001 
(0.15) 
0.100 
(0.38) 
1.669** 
(2.17) 
0.120* 
(1.71) 
∆GDP 0.034 
(1.37) 
-1.116** 
(-2.09) 
-0.686 
(-0.22) 
0.017 
(0.27) 
UNEMP 0.062*** 
(4.08) 
-0.203 
(-0.80) 
0.999 
(0.56) 
-0.034 
(-0.55) 
RQ -0.141 
(-0.44) 
-15.89*** 
(-3.85) 
-99.96*** 
(-4.10) 
-8.357*** 
(-4.76) 
GT 0.043 
(0.11) 
-6.404 
(-1.04) 
22.42 
(0.79) 
0.547 
(0.30) 
PS -1.326*** 
(-5.35) 
-5.265 
(-1.01) 
-21.25 
(-1.14) 
1.040 
(1.19) 
LEGAL 1.087** 
(2.49) 
-2.429 
(-0.31) 
103.69*** 
(5.23) 
4.580 
(1.56) 
COC 0.418 
(0.96) 
3.977 
(0.59) 
-16.28 
(-1.03) 
4.643** 
(2.03) 
Adjusted R 80.03 54.89 34.41 62.52 
F-statistic     
p-value     
Observations 36 35 30 62 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable definitions and data sources 
The table shows the definition of the variables used in the paper and the data sources 
Name Definition Source 
SDFD The standard deviation of the ratio of private credit of deposit 
money banks to GDP. 
Global Financial Development 
Database 
INF Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) World Bank 
UNEMP Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) ILO estimates, archived in 
World Bank 
GDP Real gross domestic product growth rate (%) World Bank 
LERNER The Lerner index is defined as the difference between output 
prices and marginal costs (relative to prices). Lerner index is 
widely used as an indicator of the degree of market power for 
the banking sector (Beck et al., 2013).  
Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank 
BCON Banking concentration is defined as the ratio of the assets of 
the three largest commercial banks to total commercial 
banking assets in a country.  
Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank 
SIZE Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP 
Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank 
FGN Percentage of the number of foreign owned banks to the 
number of the total banks in an economy.  
Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank 
NIM Net interest margin ratio Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank 
NII Bank noninterest income to total income (%) Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank 
CI Bank cost to income ratio (%) Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank 
CAR Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%) Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank 
RQ Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. RQ ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, and higher values 
indicate higher regulatory effectiveness 
The World Governance 
Indicator Database. World 
Bank 
GT Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality 
of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
GT ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, and higher values indicate higher 
government effectiveness 
The World Governance 
Indicator Database. World 
Bank 
PS Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability 
and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. PS 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. The higher the better 
The World Governance 
Indicator Database. World 
Bank 
COC Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain. COC ranges 
from -2.5 to 2.5, and higher values indicate higher corruption 
control 
The World Governance 
Indicator Database. World 
Bank 
LEGAL The rule of law index. Higher values indicate higher efficiency 
in law enforcement.  
The World Governance 
Indicator Database. World 
Bank 
NPL The ratio of non-performing loans (payment of interest and 
principal past due date by 90 days or more) to total gross 
loans 
Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank and 
BankScope 
LLC The ratio of loan loss provisions to total non-performing 
loans over each  
Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank. 
LnZSCORE This captures the probability of default of a country’s banking 
system. Z-score compares the buffer of a country’s banking 
system (capitalization and returns) with the volatility of such 
returns. 
Global Financial Development 
Database. World Bank and 
BankScope 
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A2: Descriptive statistics. Country-level information 
 BCON CAR CI COC SIZE FGN GDP GT IN
F 
LE
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L 
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NER 
LnZSC
ORE 
NII NI
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NP
L 
LL
C 
PS RQ SDFD UNEMP 
 Mean  76.8  17.4  61.5 -0.5  25.6  47  5.1 -
0.68 
 45
.2 
-
0.6
7 
 0.28  2.22  41.
12 
 6.
63 
 11.
22 
 63
.9 
-
0.5 
-0.6  15.3  10.4 
 Median  79.6  16.3  59.1 -0.6  17.9  50  4.6 -0.72  5.
65 
-
0.6
8 
 0.29  2.27  41.
9 
 6.
02 
 8.
40 
 60 -
0.3 
-0.5  17.3  7.2 
 Max  100.0  43.4
0 
 218.1  1.2  97.8  100  149  1.04  24
411
.0 
 1.0
6 
 0.64  4.54  93
.2 
 39
.2 
 74
.1 
 19
3 
 1.1  1.1  20.1  39.3 
 Min  22.3  1.75  20.0 -2.1  1.69  0.0 -
62.07 
-1.9 -
35.
8 
-
2.2
2 
-1.32 -0.40  1.4
3 
 0.
03 
 0.
96 
 1.8
0 
-
2.9 
-2.4  1.06  0.56 
 Std. Dev.  18.7  6.26  22.9  0.6  20.1  26  8.52  0.6  82
5.9 
 0.
64 
 0.19  0.65  16.
5 
 3.
73 
 9.
56 
 26
.8 
 0.
9 
 0.6  3.97  7.7 
 Obs  660  314  836  958  883  626  943  958  90
1 
 96
0 
 542  857  83
2 
 80
4 
 31
4 
 28
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 96
0 
 960  958  940 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
